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Summary: The impact of agricultural policies and their reform is of major concern when 
addressing issues of growth, innovation and  consolidation in the food manufacturing sector.  
Growth is one of the forces fueling the globalization of food manufacturing activities.  
Market- and policy-driven forces present a myriad of opportunities to influence growth and 
reorientation of patterns at the nexus where food manufacturing links the food system.  The 
productivity and international competitiveness of the food manufacturing sector must be 
evaluated in the context of governmental incentives, international standards and the emerging 
supply- and value-chains. 
 
KEY WORDS:  Total Factor Productivity Growth, Intercountry Impacts, Dairy Products, 
Meat Products, Sugar 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Agricultural and food policies have affected the economic structure of agriculture and the food 
manufacturing and distribution.  Traditionally, technological improvements in agricultural 
production led to important structural changes.  However, a continuing trend in the U.S. and 
Europe (and emerging in Asia) is a transformation in the organization and management of 
production, processing and distribution.  Most of the explanations of the changing structure of 
production focus on the nature of innovations at the farm, processing and distribution levels, and 
their interaction with the incentives generated from commodity and trade policies. 
 
Questions relating to productivity and international competitiveness are prominent in pubic 
policy discussions.  These issues are amenable to rigorous analysis.  This paper addresses 
innovation, productivity and economic growth to elaborate on the linkages between growth 
and performance within and between economies.   
 
A major component of this paper focuses on specifying and measuring technical change and 
productivity.  Most nations have a de facto industrial policy.  However, agricultural policy is 
broader than an industry-specific policy and encompasses support to agents all along the 
production chain and the communities supporting the linkage in primary production, 
processing and distribution activities.  Some nations have a long history of state-supported 
research and development in agricultural production and management (at government 
laboratories and at agricultural colleges and universities) and state supported delivery of the 
research products.  Consequently policy makers have a keen interest in the gains this research 
and development has generated.  
 
An important issue for evaluating economic performance and growth of firms and industries 
is the role of scale economies and how innovations influence changes in factor use.  This has 
been emphasized in the traditional approaches to productivity growth and in recent studies on 
endogenous growth.  In the case of endogenous growth, these economies are more explicitly 
expressed as returns to some aspect of "capital" that generates externalities.  This notion of 
capital encompasses both human and physical capital, which are said to embody new 
knowledge and contribute to scale economies.   The external nature of capital returns is 
motivated by the hypothesis that a firm's investment capital is likely to have substantial beneficial spillover effects in reducing production costs to other firms.  Thus, an increase in 
the capital stock of one firm will appear to lower the production cost of other firms.   
 
These issues and the challenges they present to agricultural adjustment and reform will be 
illustrated by case studies for some of the most important commodities. 
 
 
2   Patterns of Growth and Technological Progress in Food Manufacturing 
 
2.1  Productivity growth and it’s decomposition by 2-digit industry  
 
The U.S. food processing and kindred products industry, which accounts for about one-sixth 
of the U.S. manufacturing sector’s activity, has experienced significant reorganization.  Harris 
(2002) reports that from 1993 to the first half of 1998 the food and kindred products sub-
industries, meat processors accounted for 60 mergers and acquisitions, dairy processors 
accounted for 69, soft drink bottlers for 53, snack food processors for 44 and poultry 
processors for 32.  These are on the heels of at least two decades of vigorous merger activity. 
 
Manufacturers attempt to increase sales, profits and market share through consolidation, 
industrialization, expanding exports, foreign growth and new value-added product 
development (ERS, Harris, 2002).   The food and kindred product industry has the sixth 
largest number of plants among twenty operating manufacturing industries in U.S. and 
produce nearly 14 percent of the total value of output in the manufacturing sector.  The 
industry has been responsive to new technologies in processing, packaging and marketing of 
food product and has become increasingly high-tech over the past few decades (Morrison, 
1997).   
 
2.1.1 Mean Productivity Analysis  
 
Table 1 presents an overview of productivity changes of the plants over the period 1973-95, 
summarizing the average Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth by periods in the food 
products industry. 
 
Table 1. Average TFP Growth without Ranking Plants in All Food Sub-Industries 
Together 
 
Time Period  Mean TFP  Mean Scale  Mean Tech. 
Change 
Mean Returns to 
Scale 
1973-75 0.030091  -0.00072  0.031957  0.92236 
1976-80 0.021557  -0.00039  0.022143  0.87745 
1981-85 0.009311  -0.00491  0.01423 0.85173 
1986-90  -0.00339 -0.01045 0.007044 0.89033 
1991-95  -0.00223 -0.00117 -0.00112 0.94673 
1973-95 0.009414  -0.00377  0.013363  0.895577 
Source: Celikkol (2003), Chapter 13. 
 
The period averages without ranking TFP growth show that food manufacturing plants start 
with a 3% productivity growth and gradually declines in the later periods finishing with a -
0.2% growth rate during the period 1991-95.  The general trend of the industry indicates that 
average TFP growth follows a declining productivity growth pattern with a considerable 
fluctuation especially after 1983, averaging 0.9% productivity growth throughout the years.   
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productivity growth during some years. For example, Heien (1983) reports negative 
productivity growth in the aggregate food sector during the ten of the years between 1958 and 
1977, Chan-Kang, Buccola and Kerkvliet (2002) during five of the years between 1963 and 
1992, and Morrison (1997) during seven of the years between 1966 and 1991.  The plant-level 
productivity study by Celikkol (2003) is the source of productivity results and patterns that 
follow.  When all plants are pooled together, average productivity growth in the food industry 
is 0.9%.  This is slightly higher than the estimate of 0.82% average productivity growth rate 
in the U.S. processes food sector (SIC 20) between 1963 and 1992 by Chan-Kang, Buccola 
and Kerkvliet (1999), and 0.78% growth between 1965 and 1991 by Morrison (1997).  
However, when we analyze each sub-industry in food and kindred products industry 
separately, our estimates indicate wide variation in the productivity growth rates and patterns 
of the industries at the plant-level.       
 
 
2.1.2  TFP Decomposition According to Quartile Ranks 
 
The plants are ranked in quartiles according to their TFP growth rates and studied further. 
Table 2 presents the average TFP growth and its components (scale and technical change 
effect) for each rank with an average returns to scale during the five prescribed time periods. 
 
 
Table 2. Total Factor Productivity Growth Rankings and TFP Growth Components 
through 1973-95 
 
TFP RANK 0 




1973-75  -0.07384 -0.09467 0.020834 0.86432 
1976-80 -0.04082  -0.05589  0.015073 0.76736 
1981-85  -0.06889 -0.08006 0.011173 0.75908 
1986-90  -0.09543 -0.10062 0.005194 0.8485 
1991-95  -0.08038 -0.06657 -0.01381 0.95971 
1973-95  -0.0717 -0.07825  0.00655 0.837663 
TFP RANK 1 




1973-75  0.014029 -0.00401 0.018039 0.90473 
1976-80  0.011053 -0.00472 0.015773 0.885 
1981-85  0.005138 -0.00574 0.010873 0.88517 
1986-90  -0.00133 -0.00534 0.004014 0.91394 
1991-95  -0.00583 -0.00422 -0.00161 0.93548 
1973-95  0.003794 -0.00487 0.008668 0.904875 
TFP RANK 2 




1973-75  0.037874 0.009334 0.02854  0.92449 
1976-80  0.027991 0.006321 0.02167  0.91697 
1981-85  0.019723 0.005365 0.014358 0.89894 
  31986-90  0.011933 0.0036  0.008333 0.92023 
1991-95  0.007633 0.003073 0.00456  0.94882 
1973-95 0.019566 0.005209 0.014357 0.921663 
TFP RANK 3 




1973-75  0.14231 0.086438  0.055868  0.98983 
1976-80  0.08795 0.052677  0.035271  0.93916 
1981-85  0.08122 0.060749  0.020468  0.86557 
1986-90 0.07115  0.060466 0.010681 0.87915 
1991-95  0.06966 0.063033  0.006628  0.94219 
1973-95  0.085948 0.06278  0.023167 0.917385 
Source: Celikkol (2003), Chapter 13. 
 
Table 2 indicates that on average, the food industry exhibits decreasing returns to scale for 
each rank, ranging from 0.84-0.92.  Average returns to scale is calculated by finding the point 
estimates of the returns to scale for each plants, grouping them according to their TFP 
quartiles, and then taking the average for the time period for each rank.  The TFP growth and 
its components indicate that on average scale effect has the most significant contribution to 
the TFP growth measurement for the lowest quartile (rank 0) and the highest quartile (rank 3) 
plants.  These scale effect contributions to TFP measurement are in the opposite (negative) 
direction for the plants in group 0 and in the same direction (positive) for the plants in group 
3.  For the rank 1, the technical change effect has the most significant contribution to the TFP 
growth measurement except during the 1986-90 and 1991-95 periods and this effect is in the 
same direction (positive) as TFP growth measurement.  For the plants in rank 2, the technical 
change effect has the larger impact on TFP growth in each period and the contribution of 
technical change effect to TFP growth is in the same direction (positive) for all periods.  
When the scale effect dominates th technical change effect, plants or firms in the industry 
extract scale efficiencies over technical gains (technological progress).  For example, the 
scale effect dominates the technical change effect for food industry plants in the lowest and 
the highest TFP categories.  For the lowest ranked plants, the situation can suggest that these 
plants cannot afford to be more productive but they have some potential productivity gains to 
be realized by organizing allocations.  For the highest ranked plants, these plants are 
extracting more out of their capacity.    On the other hand, for the plants in rank 1 and 2 the 
technical change dominates the scale effect indicating that these plants are looking toward 
technical change to realize technical gains. 
 
2.2  Input Bias of Technical Change in the Food Industry 
 
Table 3 summarizes exogenous input bias results.  These results show that technical change is 
biased toward capital (capital-using) except in the 1976-80 period with a fluctuating 
magnitude, averaging 73% through out this time period.  Technical change is labor-saving 
except in the 1973-75 and 1991-95 periods with a magnitude fluctuating from 1.3% to 0.9% 
and averaging 0.4% in all periods.  Technical change is material-using in all periods with a 
magnitude declining from 6.2% to 3.6% and averaging 3.7%.  The direction of technical 
change is toward energy except in the last period with a magnitude declining from 32.8% to 
0.4% and averaging 6.6% throughout the years.  Capital-using and labor-saving directions of 
technical change have been encouraged by a significant expansion of high-tech capital and 
increased labor costs that have occurred in the food and kindred products industry.    
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Industry 
 








1973-75  3.98278 0.012566  0.061488  0.32815 
1976-80 -0.28936  -0.00657  0.040683  0.05812 
1981-85  0.91239 -0.0259 0.027701  0.03694 
1986-90  0.22082 -0.004  0.027351  0.0172 
1991-95  0.13236 0.009364  0.035487  -0.00393 
1973-95  0.731711 -0.00425 0.036547 0.066349 
Source: Celikkol 2003, Chapter 13. 
 
This section compares our findings from each food sub-industries and all food manufacturing 
plants pooled together based on quartile ranks of TFP growth and corresponding scale and 
technical change components during the prescribed time periods.  A common finding across 
sub-industries and all food manufacturing plants together is that the scale effect makes the 
most significant contribution to the TFP growth measurement for the plants that are in the 
lowest TFP quartile group (rank 0) and the highest TFP quartile group (rank 3).  These effects 
and the average contributions of scale and technical change effects to TFP growth are shown 
in Table 4.  Scale effect dominancy over technical change effect indicates that plants or firms 
in the industry extract scale efficiencies over technical gains (technological progress).  For the 
lowest ranked plants, scale dominance can be explained since these plants cannot afford to 
realize higher productivity growth through technological adoption but they have the potential 
to reorganize input allocations to achieve productivity growth.  The exogenous technical 
change effect has the most significant contribution to TFP growth measurement for half of the 




Table 4. Contributions of Scale and Technical Change Effects on TFP Growth Across 
Sub-industries and All Food Industry Plants Together 
 
INDUSTRIES  TFP RANK 0  TFP RANK 1  TFP RANK 2  TFP RANK 3 


































































































Source: Celikkol (2003), Chapter 14. 
  
2.3  Productivity Dispersion across Industries 
 
Some plant-level studies have examined the degree of productivity dispersion in different 
industries by measuring the ratio of average TFP for the plants in the higher rank of the 
productivity distribution relative to the average in the lower ranks in some years (see 
Dhrymes (1991), Dwyer (1996) and Olley and Pakes (1996)).  Celikkol (2003) measures 
productivity dispersion across industries by calculating the absolute difference in TFP 
between the highest ranked plants (rank 3) and the lowest ranked plants (rank 0) and  the 
comparison across industries are based on the coefficient of variation for each sub- industry’s 
absolute difference between these extreme ranks.   
 
We focus on whether a persistent increasing, decreasing or fluctuating difference exists 
between the lowest ranked and the highest ranked plants throughout the time period across 
industries.  For this analysis, we ran a simple regression for each industry against time and 
time squared (in some cases) to measure the trends in each industry’s productivity dispersion.  
Table 5 summarizes the gap and trend based on the regression estimation.  
 
Table 5. Trend Analysis for Productivity Growth Gap between  
Lowest and Highest Quartile Plants 
 
Industries  Pattern of gap over time  Source of gap change 
201  decreasing to  increasing  Rank 3: decreasing & Rank 0: stable, 
then 
Rank 3: stable & Rank 0: decreasing 
202  Decreasing  Rank 3: decreasing & Rank 0: stable 
203  decreasing to increasing  Rank 3: increasing < Rank 0 increasing, 
then 
Rank 3: decreasing < Rank 0: decreasing 
204  decreasing to increasing  Rank 3: decreasing > Rank 0: decreasing 
Then 
Rank 3: decreasing < Rank 0: increasing 
205  Decreasing  Rank 3: decreasing & Rank 0: stable 
206  Decreasing  Rank 3: decreasing < Rank 0: decreasing 
207  decreasing to increasing  Rank 3: decreasing > Rank 0 decreasing, 
then 
Rank 3: decreasing < Rank 0 decreasing 
208  Decreasing  Rank 3: increasing < Rank 0: increasing, 
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209  decreasing to increasing  Rank 3: decreasing < Rank 0: decreasing, 
then 
Rank 3: stable & Rank 0: decreasing 
All Food 
Industry 
Constant  Rank 3: decreasing = Rank 0: decreasing 
Source: Celikkol (2003), Chapter 14.   
 
The most obvious fluctuating case is the grain mills products sub-industry (SIC = 204).  In 
this sub-industry, the productivity gap starts to shrink at the beginning of the time period 
since the productivity in the highest ranked plants starts to decrease while the productivity in 
the lowest ranked plants increases.  The gap then starts to increase while the most productive 
plants maintain their position but the lowest ranked plants get worse in their productivity 
growth.  The trend in the productivity difference for the dairy products, bakery products, 
sugar and confectionery products and beverages products sub-industries are decreasing for 
different reasons.   For the dairy products sub-industry (SIC = 202) and bakery products (SIC 
= 205), the lowest ranked plants remain fairly stable over time, but the highest ranked plants 
exhibit declining productivity growth.   The sugar and confectionary sub-industry (SIC = 206) 
finds both the highest and lowest ranked plants exhibiting falling productivity growth rates 
with the fall in the lowest ranked plants dominating.  The beverage products sub-industry 
(SIC = 208) has the opposite situation with both the highest and lowest ranked plants 
exhibiting increasing productivity growth rates with the increase in the lowest ranked plants 
dominating.   In other sub- industries, the gap between the most productive and the least 
productivity plants fluctuates for various reasons which are summarized in Table 5.      
 
 
3  Sub-Industry Cases 
 
The previous section provides an aggregate view point of the food manufacturing sector’s 
growth and technical change patterns, but Table 4 and 5 suggest a wide variation at the sub-
industry level. Since policies focus on commodity categories, the initial impacts are likely to 
manifest themselves in the related sub-industries.  The focus in this section is on the 
productivity patterns for the Meat Products, Dairy Products and Sugar and Confectionary 
Products sub-industries.   
 
3.1 Meat  
 
3.1.1  Background  
 
The U.S. meat products sub-industry is a significant sub-industry within the food and kindred 
products industry.  This sub-industry has the highest average employment accounting for 19% 
of total industry’s average employment, the highest total value of shipments with 21.1% of 
total industry’ total value shipments, the highest material input expenditure as a 28.6% of 
total industry’s material expenditure, the highest labor expenditure as a 25.2% of total 
industry’s labor expenditure, and the highest percent of total surviving plants (together with 
Grain Mill products sub-industry) with 16% when compared with the other sub-industries.  In 
the meat products sub-industry, increased consolidation and concentration over the past two 
decades has raised great concern for policy makers.  This issue has existed since the late 
1800s but it has became a greater concern in recent decades with the development of new 
production processes and products (“boxed beef” production) and lower red meat demand 
leading to substantial consolidation [Morrison Paul (2001)].  The four largest firms in the 
meat packing industry handled 36% of slaughter in 1960, but by 1994, only three firms 
handled the 81% of slaughter (Nguyen and Ollinger, 2002).  In addition to these structural 
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acquisitions activities over the 1977-82 period. 
 
Increased concentration and related merger and acquisitions activities for these industries 
suggest the emergence of monopsony and monopoly power, specifically in meat slaughter 
plants, which would harm animal producers as processors pay low input prices to suppliers 
and harm meat consumers by charging high prices while generating excess profits for firms is 
a result of these market structure patterns.  There have been recent studies focusing on the 
food industry using plant-level data taken from the LRD and an analysis of merger and 
acquisition activities and this relationship to productivity.  McGuckin and Nguygen (1995) 
analyze the U.S. food and beverage industry to study the relationship between ownership 
change and productivity for the period 1977-87, finding that ownership change is typically 
positively related to both initial productivity and productivity growth after acquisitions.  The 
ownership change is negatively related to initial productivity for a sample of large continuing 
production plants, but for smaller plants they find a positive relationship.  The most recent 
study by Nguyen and Ollinger (2002) investigated the relationship between the merger and 
acquisitions activity and productivity performance of plants in three 4-digit SIC meat product 
industries: meat packing (SIC 2011), sausages and other prepared meats (SIC 2013) and 
poultry slaughtering and processing (SIC 2015) for the period 1977-92.  They find that firms 
in the meat and poultry products industries preferred to acquire highly productive plants.  
These acquired plants experienced significant improvements in productivity during the post-
merger period except for those in the poultry slaughtering and processing industry.  They 
conclude that synergies associated with firm managers achieving efficiency gains by 
combining the business of the acquired and acquiring firms and related efficiencies are 
important motives for mergers and acquisitions and they place less emphasis on the 
proposition that a drive for monopoly power encourages merger and acquisitions.         
 
Paul (2001) finds significant but declining market power and cost economies in the U.S. meat 
packing industry.  While the markups of output price from monopoly power are apparent, 
evidence of markdowns from monopsony behavior in livestock input markets is weak.  
Increasing size of establishments and the resulting concentration in the industry may be the 
consequence of scale economies arising from technological factors embodied in plant and 
equipments.  Paul’s results show that the increased consolidation and concentration in this 
industry has been motivated by cost economies, but the existence of excess profitability and 
the potential for taking further advantage of such economies is minimal.   
 
Paul’s investigation into the market and cost structure of U.S. beef packing industry using the 
plant-level data finds the absence of excess profitability in the industry and suggests the 
market power and consolidation may be due to effective competition driving a 
monopolistically competitive or contestable markets type of equilibrium.  The increase in the 
size of plants and firms may also suggest the efficiency potential from scale, scope, multi-
plant and other types of cost economies that can allow larger and more diverse or specialized 
plants or firms to increase their cost effectiveness.  Paul’s estimates indicate little if any 
depression of cattle prices or excess profitability and significant cost (utilization scale and 
scope) economies in this industry.  Larger and more diversified plants embody even more 
potential technological economies than smaller plants. 
 
3.1.2  Productivity Patterns 
 
Recent studies in the meat products sub-industry lead us to investigate the productivity issues 
in more detail which relates to these recent changes in the industry.  Precise measurement of 
productivity contributes to understanding the important issues motivating merger and 
acquisition activities, the exercise of market power, characterizing the industry’s general 
structure based on the analysis of the plants and firms’ size, age and single or multiunit firm 
characteristics as well as the industry’s pre-and post-merger productivity patterns. 
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In the TFP growth decomposition, the scale effect is the most significant component of the 
TFP growth for the plants, which are in the lowest rank throughout the time periods and in the 
highest rank except in the time period 1976-80.  The average contributions of scale effects to 
TFP growth for these ranks are 115.5% and 66%, respectively.  The exogenous technical 
change effect presents the most significant contribution for the plants in the middle rank 
groups (rank 1 and rank 2), with an average of 133.7% and 85%, respectively.   Plants that are 
in the lowest and the highest ranks extract scale efficiencies over technological progress.  For 
the lowest ranked plants, this situation can suggest that these plants cannot afford to realize 
higher productivity growth through technological adoption but they have the potential to 
reorganize input allocations to achieve productivity growth.   
 
In the meat products sub-industry, exogenous input bias results show that technical change is 
biased toward capital except in the 1981-85 period and against materials except in the 1973-
75 period.  For energy, technical change is biased toward energy after 1976-80 and toward 
labor in all time periods. 
 
The time profile of productivity growth in meat products indicates that the plants in rank 1 
and rank 2 quartile groups follow a similar pattern with an almost no gap between one other.  
However, the plants in the highest ranked group (rank 3) and the lowest ranked group (rank 0) 
exhibit productivity pattern changes and maintain the gap from other quartile groups.  The 
lowest ranked plants catch the plants that are in ranks 1 and 2 after 1977 until 1984.  They 
decrease the gap significantly when these plants are compared to earlier years such as 1974, 
1975 and 1976.  Therefore, we detect various degrees of productivity between the meat 
products plants and separate the productive plants from the relatively less productive plants 
throughout the time period.  The results suggest that growth occurs for each productivity scale 
group despite negative growth for the lowest productive ranked group. 
 
The analysis investigating the number of times that plants change their productivity rankings 
shows that 9% of the meat products sub-industry plants do not change their productivity 
rankings throughout the time period.  This percentage declines slightly as the plants age and 
25% of meat sub-industry plants switch once, with 18% of the youngest plants, 29% of the 
middle-aged plants and 26% of the oldest plants switching once.  Considering all age 
categories and the industry plants pooled together for this sub-industry, 37% of all plants 
switch twice, 38% of the youngest plants, 33% of the middle-aged plants, and 38 % of the 
oldest plants throughout the time periods, suggesting considerable movement in plants’ 
productivity categories for this industry.  Plant productivity transition tables in Celikkol 
(2003) show that meat products plants do not occupy a fixed rank with respect to their 
productivity levels.  In fact, in no case do 50% of the plants stay in the same category, 
indicating considerable movement between productivity rank categories.   
 
 
3.2  Dairy 
 
3.2.1  Background 
  
The U.S. dairy products sub-industry (along with the canned, frozen, preserved fruits, 
vegetables sub-industry) has the second largest percentage of plants (13%) which survived 
through 1972-95 period based on the total number of plants among all food manufacturing.  It 
is the fourth largest sub-industry based on the material expenditure with 11.2% of total 
industry’s material expenditures.  Dairy products account for 7.3% of total food and kindred 
products industry’s energy expenditure, 6.1% of industry’s employment expenditure, 6.3% of 
industry’s combined machinery and building investment expenditures as well as 6.1% of 
industry’s machinery investment expenditure and 7.2% of industry’s building investment 
  9expenditures.   Dairy products sub-industry’s total value of shipments is the fifth largest with 
9.3% of total food and kindred products industry’s total value of shipments.    
 
Based on the recent reports by Harris (2002), the number of food processing plants rose 5% 
from 1992 to 1997.  However, this increase is only in some industries where the small number 
of food processors has increased such as small salsa makers.  But, over the last two decades 
across the food proceeding industry, the number of establishments have declined and the 
dairy products sub-industry lost the most establishments (approximately 190 establishments).  
Mergers and acquisitions are also seen in dairy and concentration continues to increase. For 
example, Harris (2002) reports that large dairy processing firms account for an increase share 
of dairy sales and companies with $800 million or more in sales accounted for 69% of U.S. 
dairy sales in 1998.  Large U.S. dairy cooperatives gained market share from 17% in 1975 to 
27% in 1998 relative to proprietary dairy companies (39% to 42%). 
 
3.2.2  Productivity Patterns 
 
In the TFP growth decomposition, on average, the scale effect is the most significant 
component of TFP growth for the plants in TFP ranks 0, 1 and 3.  The average contributions 
of scale effects to TFP growth for these ranks are 93.2%, 82.9%, and 94.7%, respectively.  
Exogenous technical change has the most significant contribution throughout the time periods 
for the plants in rank 2, with an average of 389.4%.  Plants in the lowest, middle and the 
highest ranks extract scale efficiencies over technological progress.  For the lowest TFP 
ranked plants, this situation suggests that these plants cannot afford to realize higher 
productivity growth through technological adoption but they have the potential to reorganize 
input allocations to achieve productivity growth. 
 
For dairy products, exogenous input bias results show that technical change is biased toward 
capital, averaging 10.4% throughout the time period, and toward labor after the 1976-80 
period, averaging 9.5%.  Technical change is biased against materials except in 1981-85, 
averaging –0.18% over all years.  The direction of technical change is biased against energy 
during 1981-85 and 1991-95 and toward energy during the remaining periods, averaging –
2.6% throughout the years.   
 
In dairy products, the time profile of productivity growth for all quartile groups indicates that 
plants in the TFP ranks 1 and 2 follow one another closely with a small persistent gap 
throughout the period.  Plants in the lowest and the highest TFP growth categories present a 
significant gap.  The lowest ranked plants close the gap between the other categories until 
1977 and gaps between other categories remain constant after 1977 until the end of the 
period.  Plants in the lowest TFP rank have the most fluctuating productivity growth patterns 
over the course of this study.  Overall, there is a gap among all the TFP growth ranks; in 
particular between the highest and the lowest TFP ranked plants. For example, while the 
lowest ranked plants’ productivity growth averaged –1.9%, the highest ranked plants’ 
productivity growth averages 1.1% over the study period.  Plant productivity transition tables 
in Celikkol (2003) generally show that no more than 50% of the plants stay in the same 
category in the dairy products sub-industry suggesting considerable movements between 
productivity rank categories.   
 
 
3.3  Sugar and Confectionery Products 
 
3.3.1  Background 
 
The U.S. sugar and confectionery products sub-industry is relatively small, with the 
percentage of plants based on total industry’s plants accounting for 7.3% of total food and 
kindred products industry’s material expenditure, 11.8% of industry’s energy expenditure, 
  10and 8.2% of industry’s employment expenditure.  During the time frame considered, the sub-
industry has the sixth largest capital investment expenditures with a 9.7% of total industry’s 
machinery investment expenditure, 7.7% of total industry’s building expenditure as well as 
9.3% of total industry’s combined machinery and building investment expenditures.  Total 
value of shipments from the plants that survived during the course of the study constitutes 
about 8% of total food and kindred products industry’s total value of shipments.  Although 
this sub-industry is one of the most understudied among the food sub-industries, U.S imports 
by sugar and confectionery products industry reached $3.5 billion during 2000 and new plants 
entered during the 1992-97 period.   
 
3.3.2  Productivity Patterns 
 
In the TFP growth decomposition, the scale effect is the most significant component of the 
TFP growth for the plants in TFP ranks 0, 1 and 3 throughout the time periods. The average 
contributions of the scale effect to TFP growth for these ranks are 109.5%, 560.9% and 
93.2%, respectively.  The exogenous technical change effect is the most significant 
contribution for the TFP rank 2 plants throughout the time period with an average of 82.9%.  
Plants in the lower TFP ranks (rank 0 and 1), and the highest TFP rank exhibit scale 
efficiencies over technological progress.  For the lowest TFP ranking plants, this situation 
suggests that these plants cannot afford to realize higher productivity growth through 
technological adoption but they have the potential to reorganize input allocations to achieve 
productivity growth.  
 
In sugar and confectionery products, the exogenous input bias results imply that technical 
change is biased toward capital and materials except in the 1973-75 period, toward labor 
except in the 1973-75 and 1981-85 periods, and toward energy except in the 1973-75 and 
1976-80 periods.   The capital-and labor-using nature of technical change can be attributed to 
the increased machinery sophistication and new equipment developments.  These changes in 
turn require a better-trained labor force.   
 
In sugar and confectionery products, the time profile of productivity growth for all quartile 
groups indicates that plants in all quartile groups follow a similar TFP growth pattern with 
almost no gap between TFP ranks 1 and 2, and a constant and small gap between the lowest 
ranked plants (rank 0) and the highest ranked plants (rank 3).  Even though the different 
ranked plants in this sub-industry exhibit similar patterns and the gap between them is small, 
and we are able to separate the productive plants from the lowest productivity plants.   
 
Plant’s productivity transition tables in Celikkol (2003) show that sugar and confectionery 
products plants generally do not occupy a fixed rank with respect to their productivity levels 
with rarely more than 50% of the plants staying in the same category except for the plants that 
are in the two younger age categories in rank 3 during the first two periods, indicating 
considerable movement between productivity rank categories.  Less than half of the plants 
stay in the same category, and most of the plants switch categories throughout the time 
periods.    
 
 
4  Role of Agricultural Production and Trade Policies  
 
The historical orientation of agricultural policies is directed at commodity production with 
some trade policies intending to address commodity producers’ welfare.  Domestic price 
support and income policies are directed at farmers and trade policies have focused on 
managing domestic surpluses by stimulating export demand (e.g., the Export Enhancement 
Program) commercially, lending or gifting excess supply for development purposes (e.g., PL 
480 program), and preventing foreign supply from entering the domestic market.  With 
commodity production being one node in the food system, the impact of policies intended to 
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system.  Hence, the impact of the commodity-based programs is evident at the food 
manufacturing level. 
 
4.1  Meat Products 
 
The meat industry has seen major changes over the past several decades, although the changes 
have been driven more by technology than policy.  The development of boxed beef plus the 
commodity nature of the beef market allowed Iowa Beef Packers (now part of Tyson) to 
change the location of the beef packing industry from cities to the feeding area, and to replace 
skilled meat cutters with less skilled assembly-line workers.  In the process all of the former 
industry leaders were driven from business and replaced by companies with fewer outmoded 
and poorly located plants.  The broiler industry had used on-farm technological advances to 
reshape and relocate the processing industry in the 1950s and 60s and the pork industry did 
the same in the 1990s.  The recent purchase of IBP by Tyson is the first large-scale joint 
ownership of red meat and poultry processors.  Lawsuits about food safety and additional 
regulations may have sped the consolidation of the industry and ended small-scale slaughter 
facilities, but these changes would have occurred because of the economics in any case.  
Branded processed meat still has many small firms, but the commodity portion of the meat 
industry is increasingly the purview of larger firms.  Poultry and beef have gone to greater 
further processing in the factory, using large size economies to move these steps from the 
supermarket, restaurant, and home. 
 
 
4.2  Dairy Products 
 
The dairy processing industry is affected by policy in two ways.  The most obvious is the 
classified pricing system, which when combined with regional price pooling, induces 
production of cheese and other storable products in regions where it would not otherwise 
occur.  For example, cheese producers all pay the same price for milk, the class III price.  
However, farmers delivering their milk to the cheese plant do not receive the class III price, 
but a higher price that is a weighted average of the four class prices, with the weights 
determined by the usage of milk for the different products in that region.  Without pooling no 
farmer in a higher priced region, such the northeastern United States, would want to deliver to 
the cheese plant because it would be a lower price than he would receive at a fluid plant.  This 
would mean a northeastern cheese plant would have to pay more for its milk and would soon 
be driven from business by a Wisconsin cheese plant that paid less for its milk.  Without 
classified pricing and pooling, one would expect more geographic concentration of cheese 
plants in the low priced regions and probably more concentration of milk production in these 
regions.  The classified pricing system also administers spatial price differentials in Class I 
(fluid) milk.  These differentials create artificial spatial price differentials that are sometimes 
greater than would occur in a free market.  This also encourages milk production in deficit 
regions since the price is artificially high in those regions, especially the southeastern United 
States. 
 
A second distortion is created by the price support program.  The willingness of the 
government to buy cheese, butter, and powdered milk at the support price, often keeps these 
prices higher than they would be otherwise and encourages production of supported 
commodities at a level greater than is justified by market conditions.  A lot of skim milk 
powder in particular has been purchased in recent years, making butter-powder plants more 
profitable and, with the classified pricing system, allowing them to continue to exist in deficit 
regions. 
 
Beyond agricultural policy effects the dairy industry has seen major changes recently.  Driven 
by WalMart, the supermarket industry has had many mergers in the past decade as they 
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who can serve the chains across the country.  In response, the fluid milk bottling industry has 
gone from almost entirely regional firms, to being dominated by two rapidly growing national 
firms, Suiza and Dean Foods.  These firms were allowed to merge in 2001, creating a single 
national fluid bottler with 40% of the market.  In response to these changes, two national 
dairy cooperatives were created through the merger of regional milk marketing cooperatives, 
Dairy Farmers of America and Land O’Lakes.   
 
 
4.3  Sugar and Confectionery Products 
 
American sugar policy has clearly affected the shape of the sugar processing industry.  The 
policy restricted imports, thereby holding the price of sugar well above world prices and 
further used to quotas to keep domestic beet sugar and cane sugar production at 
approximately the same size.  By keeping the price of sugar so high, the policy encouraged 
the development of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) and other sugar substitutes.  At this 
point, any food product that can use a liquid caloric sweetener has switched from sugar to 
HFCS, especially soft drinks.  As a result the share of imported sugar in the market dropped 
steadily, finally reaching a point where the sugar program went from just a consumer-
financed price support to having considerable budget impact.  Accordingly, most sugar plants 
in port cities like Philadelphia that processed imported cane sugar lost their business and 
closed.  Sugar-beet processors and domestic cane processors owe their existence to the 
protective policy and domestic quotas, which have defined their locations and ability to grow.  
There have been many mergers over the years and other consolidation in the domestic 
industry, vaguely like the rest of the food industry.  However, widespread relocation of the 
industry and other changes that might have occurred did not.  Neither beet nor cane sugar 
could compete well with imported sugar without protection. 
 
The production of chocolate and other confectionary products is affected by the sugar, peanut, 
and, to a lesser extent, dairy policies.  With artificially inflated input prices, costs are 
increased, unfavourably affecting final product demand and encouraging imports and 
movement of the industry offshore. 
 
5  Consolidation in the Food Sector 
 
5.1  Background 
 
Increasing concentration has been a characteristic of the U.S. food processing industry in 
recent decades.  Food processing, distribution and retailing activities account for the majority 
of retail food and beverage costs for all major US commodity groups.  These costs amount to 
80% of consumer’s expenditures on food, about 75% of the cost of food at home and 84% for 
food away from home.  The share of costs attributable to these marketing activities is rising 
over time, from 62% in 1953, which reflects the additional services included in food costs.  
The trend of the farm share of the market declined rapidly since 1980 from 40% to 22.2% in 
1998 and is attributable to forces arising in both food manufacturing and food retailing.   
 
Behavior in the marketing sector has an increasingly independent effect on the welfare of 
both consumers and farmers.  As the marketing sector moved to improve its profitability, it 
reached the point where most internal efficiencies were achieved.  Further efficiencies were 
mainly available through increased coordination with suppliers and customers. 
 
The top 20 food manufacturers accounted for 50% of food-processing value added in 1995 
(this is more than double the corresponding share in 1954) (Sexton, 2000).  Part of this 
increase arises from more value added products and part because of the numerous mergers 
between food processors during this period which created larger and more multi-product 
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economies in acquisitions across product categories only to observe the pendulum swinging 
back as these firms divest of less profitable units and focus on core competencies.  
 
Concentration at the food retailing sector is a more recent trend to emerge.  The Top 4 
supermarket retailers controlled 16-17% of supermarket sales in 1930 and 1990, but doubled 
to 34% by 1999 (Kinsey, 2000).  The creation of national supermarket chains in response to 
WalMart is a major part of this.  The concentration in local markets has always been much 
higher, with a few dominant firms in most markets. 
 
5.2  Concerns 
 
The first concern is that a handful of food manufacturers will supply the bulk of our 
foodstuffs.  The drivers of consolidation and concentration include i) technological advances 
in inventory control and management and manufacturing processes, and ii) economic forces 
related to scale economies and the value of money.  The consolidation of the food-marketing 
sector can have important positive implications.  Enhanced efficiency can lead to higher 
welfare.  The cost of market power leads to efficiency gains and thus lower costs to the 
consumers.  The deleterious impacts of concentration and consolidation relate to the distorting 
impact market power has on the incentives to undertake market-expanding activities.   Since 
processors or related market power transfers surplus from farmers, incentives at the farm level 
to undertake investments in demand expansion (such as advertising) or cost reduction (such as 
adopting new technologies) are adversely affected.  Similarly, the transfer of surplus to the 
marketing sector gives marketing firms an incentive to undertake some new investment to 
reduce their costs with new technologies and to engage in advertising.   
 
The second major concern of consolidation and concentration is that a few powerful 
supermarket chains provide high quality products at low prices.  Ellickson (1999) focused on 
how many supermarket firms control the market and finds two or three firms dominate 
smaller markets while most larger markets are controlled by between 2-5 firms.  In the largest 
markets, only 3-4 firms dominate 60% of the MSAs.  If only 3-4 firms fit into the majority of 
large markets, we should expects to find monopolies (i.e., a sole firm) in the smaller markets.  
In fact, there is no tendency toward a single dominant firm in any markets except small 
towns.  If concentration were being driven by exogenous economies of scale, we would 
expect to consistently observe one firm, especially in the smaller markets.  The fact that so 
few single dominant firms are observed even in the smallest markets, suggests that natural 
oligopoly is a stable outcome and that some additional force is driving industry structure.  The 
oligopolistic structure does not fragment as market size expands.  These natural oligarchs 
compete head-to-head for the same consumers.   The presence of rival high quality firms’ 
forces competing stores to increase their own level of quality (as measured by the store size).    
 
A third major concern is that a handful of food manufacturers will supply the bulk of our 
foodstuffs.  The consolidation of the food-marketing sector can have important positive 
implications.  Enhanced efficiency can lead to higher welfare.   
 
Britain and Australia have had a much more concentrated food retail sector than the U.S. for 
many years and inferences from these markets can be made about future actions in the U.S. 
market.  Certainly, Australian supermarket chains dramatically affected the structure of the 
dairy industry once deregulation of milk markets occurred. 
                   
 
6  Intercountry Impacts 
 
Although many anticipated considerable affects from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) on the structure of the Mexican and Canadian food industries, to date 
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greatest exposure for change, but meat and grain markets may see substantial impacts as well.  
Although considerable trade occurs in these latter products, to date grain movements have 
been in raw form and meat in processed form.  Given the geography or both Canada and 
Mexico, many markets would be more easily served by U.S. sources in a free trade 
environment, with some U.S. markets being logical Canadian or Mexican outlets.  The 
Northeastern United States is a latter example, especially for dairy. 
 
The expansion of the EU should cause similar effects, as new members have easier access to 
Germany and Italy than some of their current suppliers, changing trade patterns, with 
corresponding impacts on affected plants.  An interesting anomaly may occur with expansion, 
as greater WTO access undermines the Common Agricultural Policy since some new 
members held access quotas before and greater access will have to be granted to outsiders, 
such as Serbia, Russia, and Ukraine. 
 
Clearly freer trade makes restrictive agricultural policies unsustainable and protected plants 
and industries (such as sugar) may find their future at risk.  At the same time, freer movement 
of capital may lead to investment in processors in developing countries, especially given their 
greater market access.  Manufacturing jobs, already under pressure in high wage countries, 
will be further at risk with open markets.  Whether this creates enough economic activity to 
slow migration is an open question (Dunn and Bailey, 2003). 
 
7  Potential Trends and Patterns 
 
Consolidation in the food manufacturing sector is not necessarily coincident with increases in 
market power at consumers’ expense.  Oftentimes, consolidation is focused regionally.  In the 
advent of growing, more integrated marketing channels, food industry giants tend to find 
themselves going head-to head for market share.   Regional brands still hold significant 
appeal to consumers and examples abound of the inability of emerging national brands to gain 
a leading position in all regional markets.  The future patterns and trends arising from 
consolidation will likely depend on specific product categories or the marketing channels 
embedded in a region.  
 
Growth arises from both scale effects (doing more of the same thing) and innovation (doing it 
a new way).  The technological progress is evident in all linkages in the food system.  
Inventory management advances have influenced the function between commodity 
production and commodity transformation (or food manufacturing) and between commodity 
transformation and commodity distribution.   The entrepreneurial capital associated with 
innovation leads to growth by serving as a mechanism for knowledge spillovers, increasing 
competition by the increased number of enterprises, and providing diversity among firms.  
There is both a supply and demand side for innovations.  Innovations evolve along the four 
phases of functionality, reliability, convenience and then price.  What forces the transition 
from one phase to the next to occur is performance oversupply; i.e., when firms oversupply 
the ability to satisfy customers’ needs, then the competition shifts to the next phase.   
 
In the longer run, the role of public policies is manifested by growth in the food 
manufacturing system and the larger food system.  The impact of commodity policies directed 
at primary commodity producers and the agents in the food system closest to them eventually 
radiate through the chain in the form of innovations that may not be undertaken.  The impact 
of policies directed at value-added products such as those related to food safety and quality 
assurance radiate forward to consumers and are predicated on traceability standards that by 
definition radiate backward through the food system.   
 
Market- and policy-driven forces have a myriad of opportunities to influence growth and 
reorientation of patterns at the nexus where food manufacturing links the food system.  The 
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evaluated in the context of governmental incentives, international standards and the emerging 
supply- and value-chains. 
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